There’s an oft-repeated story about Thomas Jefferson’s visit to a Baltimore hotel when Jefferson was vice-president of the United States. (I don’t know the date of story’s first written account, or where that account first appeared.)
Here’s the telling of Mr. Jefferson’s unsuccessful reservation, from a website on the vice-presidency:
In another classic anecdote, our nation’s second Vice President, Thomas Jefferson, was riding his horse through Baltimore and needed a place to rest for the night. Whip in hand and covered in dirt, he entered a hotel barroom and asked if there were any rooms available. Looking him over, the landlord replied, “We have no room for you, sir.” Jefferson asked once more and the landlord repeated that there was no room.
After Jefferson left, a wealthy gentleman entered the bar and informed the landlord that Thomas Jefferson had just left. “The Vice President of the United States?! Murder and death, what have I done?” cried the landlord. He quickly located a servant, ordering him to find the VP and offer him the best of everything the hotel could provide.
When the servant found Jefferson in another hotel across town, Jefferson replied, “Tell him I have engaged a room here. Tell him that I value his good intentions highly, but if he has no room for a dirty farmer, he shall have no room for the Vice President.”
Jefferson sees the initial refusal correctly, and responds wisely (and cleverly).
In this private transaction, Jefferson doesn’t deny that the hotelier has the right to refuse service to a farmer; Jefferson simply rejects the establishment’s class bias. (The hotel didn’t ask if a supposed, ordinary farmer could pay, but instead rejected a prospective guest for reasons other than an ability to pay.)
Now consider a similar response from a public institution, one that rests on public funds, for limited and specific purposes, under public law.
What does it say if a public institution treats the farmer differently from the supposed town notable?
More broadly, what does it say about a society where public services (not private ones) are offered only to those who complain, or are offerered only to a privileged few?
Should one feel contented that, either by undeserved status or by strenuous objection, one received those things that anyone in the community should have received at the first instance?
About that kind of disparate treatment, there is every reason to be concerned.
From that concern, there derives a compelling justification to work for better public institutions.