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The Argument for Rational Voter Ignorance

In this contentious election season (and what elections are not?), what to make of the case for rational voter ignorance, that being informed about candidates and issues is of slight value, and may rationally, sensibly be ignored?

Today, I’ll briefly set out the case that proponents of the concept make. Tomorrow, I’ll reply to it. Make no mistake, it’s a serious, and not a trivial argument. Those who advance it are hardly foolish, but are themselves rational, sober, intelligent.

Ilya Somin of the George Mason School of Law sets out the argument for rational ignorance:

Voters do not have to be policy wonks to make an informed decision. Sometimes they can get by through the use of what scholars call “information shortcuts,” relying on small bits of information as a substitute for deeper knowledge. For example, even if a voter knows nothing about Candidate X as an individual, a lot of useful information about X’s policy positions can be derived simply from knowing what party he belongs to. But lack of basic knowledge is difficult to overcome through shortcuts. Knowing that a candidate is a Democrat is only useful information to a voter if he or she has some idea of what positions the Democrats stand for, how they differ from the Republicans, and what the likely effects of their competing policy proposals are.

Why Political Ignorance is Rational

It is tempting to conclude that voters must be lazy or stupid. But even a smart and hardworking person can rationally decide not to pay much attention to political information. No matter how well-informed a citizen is, one vote has only a tiny chance of affecting the outcome of an election; about one chance in 100 million in the case of a presidential race. As a result, even a citizen who cares a great deal about public policy has little incentive to acquire sufficient knowledge to make an informed choice. Becoming a well-informed voter is, in most situations, simply irrational. Unfortunately, the rational decisions of individuals create a dysfunctional collective outcome in which the majority of the electorate is dangerously ill-informed.

People who can influence politics in ways beyond casting a vote and those who simply find politics interesting might learn about it for perfectly rational reasons. Political professionals such as lobbyists and interest group leaders have strong incentives to become informed. But few of us are influential activists, or otherwise have political clout that goes beyond the power of the vote. And most Americans find politics far less interesting than other forms of entertainment. Polls show that many more people know the names of the judges on “The People’s Court” than those on the Supreme Court. A March 2006 survey revealed that 52% of Americans can name two or more characters from the Simpsons, but only 28% can name two or more First Amendment rights.

(Note: Somin does not advocate ignorance — he simply observes that in elections it may be rational.)

A podcast in which Somin sets out the argument of rational ignorance is available at Cato:

So, if Somin’s right generally — and he himself is knowledgeable and personally informed — why learn about candidates, issues, blog on politics, support the League, etc?

Tomorrow: Arguments in Favor of an Informed Electorate.

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